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Does the Obligation to Obtain the Consent of a 
Third Party Extend to Taking Further Steps After 
Rejection? 
 
The question posed in the Court of Appeal case of The One Suites Pte Ltd v Pacific 
Motor Credit (Pte) Ltd[2015] SGCA 21 (“The One Suites”) was whether an obligation 
to use all reasonable endeavours to obtain the consent of a third party extends to taking 
further steps after the third party had refused to give such consent. To this, the Court, 
with Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA writing its grounds of decision, answered, “it 
depends but largely no”. More precisely, the Court said that while there almost 
invariably will be an implied obligation to use all reasonable endeavours to obtain the 
consent of a third party, it is less likely that such an obligation extends beyond 
rejection, particularly so when there is an express term providing that the contract is 
at an end following such rejection. In reaching this conclusion, the Court also discussed 
aspects of implied terms, as well as the doctrine of good faith in contract.  
 
Facts 
 
The One Suites concerned the sale and purchase of the remainder of the lease over a 
property. The appellant was the purchaser, and the respondent was the vendor. On 27 
July 2012, the appellant exercised the option to purchase (“OTP”), having already paid 
a total sum of $1.68m to the respondent as deposit. However, the property could not 
change hands just yet as it was sold subject to the “existing approved use”. Moreover, 
its sale was also subject to the written approval of the Housing and Development Board 
(“HDB”). In the event that HDB refused to approve the sale of the property, then 
according to an express term of the OTP, “the sale … shall be rescinded and all moneys 
paid to account of the purchase price herein shall be refunded free of interest 
compensation”. 
  
After the OPT was exercised, the appellant sought HDB’s approval for the sale. In 
addition, it also sought the approvals of other relevant authorities, such as the National 
Environment Agency (“NEA”). After an exchange of correspondence, the NEA replied 
on 21 August 2012 that it was unable to support the appellant’s proposed sale as its 
proposed use did not conform with the long-term land use plan for the site on which 
the property sat. On 24 September 2012, HDB also replied to say that it was “unable to 
grant in-principle approval” because the “NEA’s consent has not been obtained”. 
 
The appellant then wrote to the respondent, saying that, following HDB’s rejection, the 
sale of the property had been “rescinded” and claimed for the refund of its $1.68m 
deposit. The respondent rejected this notice of rescission, saying that the appellant 
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should appeal against NEA’s decision after revising its proposed use to address NEA’s 
concerns. When the appellant refused to do this, the respondent unilaterally wrote to 
the NEA asking it to reverse its earlier decision on the basis that there would be no 
change to the “existing use” of the property. The NEA approved the sale after this. 
However, when the appellant heard about this, it of course rejected the respondent’s 
unilateral appeal on its behalf and asserted its right to the refund of $1.68m on the 
basis that the transaction had been cancelled following HDB’s rejection earlier on.   
 
The legal issue was thus whether the appellant owed (and subsequently breached) a 
contractual duty to use all reasonable endeavours to secure HDB’s 
approval after HDB’s initial rejection. The respondent argued that the appellant 
should have appealed against NEA’s rejection and then reapplied to HDB for approval. 
In the High Court, the judge found that the HDB had not clearly and unequivocally 
rejected the appellant’s application on 24 September 2012. Thus, in his view, the issue 
was whether the appellant had taken all reasonable steps to secure the NEA’s approval, 
which could then be used to obtain HDB’s approval. He found that the appellant had 
not taken all reasonable steps. In fact, he thought that the appellant had lost interest 
in the transaction and was seeking to get out of its agreement with the respondent. 
While he found on behalf of the respondent in this regard, he refused to grant specific 
performance or award damages due to lack of proof of loss. Nonetheless, he allowed 
the respondent to keep the $1.68m deposit as security for the appellant’s performance 
of its obligations under the OTP.  
 
Decision and discussion 
 
Express term trumping any implied term of further obligation 
 
The appellant succeeded on appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court adopted a fact-
centric approach to the question, which must surely be right given the highly factual 
character of non-absolute obligations (see Yip Man and Goh Yihan, “Default Standards 
for Non-absolute Obligation Clauses” [2014] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarter 32). The Court first found that the HDB had in fact refused to approve the sale 
of the property on 24 September 2012. Thus, the question then became whether, 
following the HDB’s rejection, the appellant was under any further obligation to take 
further steps to obtain HDB’s approval, such as by lodging an appeal against HDB’s 
decision, or that of related entities (in this case, the NEA).  
 
While the Court had no issue with there generally being an implied obligation to use 
reasonable endeavours to obtain the requisite approvals of relevant authorities when 
the sale of land is subject to such approvals, it did not think that this obligation should 
invariably extend to taking further steps after any approval had been refused. This is 
especially true where there is an express term ending the contract following the initial 
rejection. This was the case in The One Suites, where the OTP provided that the sale 
shall be rescinded in the event the HDB refuses to approve the sale. Thus, once HDB 
refused to approve the sale, the OTP came to an end and the appellant came under no 
further obligation to use reasonable endeavours in any matter such as appealing 
against the HDB’s (or the NEA’s) rejection.  
 
It is of course trite law that implied terms are subservient to express terms in a 
contract. Thus, the express term providing for the end of the OTP upon the HDB’s 
rejection would trump any purported implied term imposing on the appellant a further 
obligation to use all reasonable endeavours to secure HDB’s approval. Indeed, this is a 
result aptly reached by the application of the Court of Appeal’s three-step test for the 
implication of terms in fact laid down in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte 
Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 193. Applying the first step would show that there was no gap in the 
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contract to be filled since the parties had provided for when the contract was to come 
to an end. The second step would also be negative as it was clearly not necessary in the 
business sense to imply a term as the parties had already provided for when the 
contract is to end by way of an express term.  
 
No general legal duty to do more after initial rejection 
 
More broadly, the Court also held that there is no general proposition of law that a 
party had to take further steps after an initial rejection in order to rescind the contract 
concerned. The Court did not think that such a proposition was laid down in the High 
Court case of Tan Soo Leng David v Wee, Satku & Kumar Pte Ltd[1997] 3 SLR(R) 257. 
Instead, it thought that the court in that case was simply saying that whether there was 
a duty to use reasonable endeavours after consent had been refused depended on the 
precise facts of each case. It may well be appropriate for a court to consider the steps 
taken after initial refusal where very little was done before the refusal. This may also 
be appropriate when it may be implied that parties have stipulated for such an 
obligation after rejection. However, even then this must yield to an express term where 
one existed: where parties have expressly provided for rescission upon the refusal of 
the requisite consent, the implied obligation to use reasonable endeavours could not 
extend beyond the point of refusal. With respect, this must be correct and is the 
application of trite contractual principles that the parties’ clearly expressed intentions 
must be given effect to. The practical point may be that where parties want this 
outcome, they should provide for it expressly. 
 
Implied duty of parties to cooperate? 
 
Given the Court’s decision as outlined above, there was no further need to consider the 
respondent’s argument that there ought to be an implied duty of cooperation in the 
OTP. The Court declined to express any view on the permissibility of such an implied 
duty because it saw the potential relationship between such a duty and the doctrine of 
good faith. It regarded the doctrine of good faith to be a rather uncertain doctrine even 
though the position in Singapore, following Ng Giap Hon v Westcomb Securities Pte 
Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 518, is that there is no implied duty of good faith based on an 
implied term in law, although it might be possible for such a duty to be implied in fact. 
As such, whether there is an implied duty to cooperate in law remains to be decided on 
another day, although it is clear that any argument on its permissibility would also 
have to address the permissibility of a wider doctrine of good faith than that which is 
currently accepted under Singapore contract law. 
 
 
Goh Yihan (Associate Professor, Singapore Management University) 
 
 
* This blog entry may be cited as Goh Yihan, "Does the Obligation to Obtain the 
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